Book Chapters

Upjohn Research home page

1-1-1996

Emergency Extensions of Unemployment Insurance: A Critical
Review and Some New Empirical Findings
Stephen A. Woodbury
Michigan State University and W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, woodbury@upjohn.org

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/bookchapters

Citation
Woodbury, Stephen A. 1996. "Emergency Extensions of Unemployment Insurance: A Critical Review and
Some New Empirical Findings." In Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation: Background
Papers. Washington, DC: The Council, 1995-1996, Vol. 3, p. [JJ1]-JJ70.
https://research.upjohn.org/bookchapters/97

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

Emergency Extensions of Unemployment Insurance:
A Critical Review and Some New Empirical Findings

Stephen A. Woodbury
Michigan State University and
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

December 1995

Paper prepared for the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, whose
support is gratefully acknowledged. Richard Deibel provided valuable research
assistance and Claire Vogelsong assisted with preparation of the tables.

Emergency Extensions of Unemployment Insurance:
A Critical Review and Some New Empirical Findings
Stephen A. Woodbury
December 1995

Starting with the recession of 1958, the potential duration of unemployment
benefits that are regularly provided by states has been extended by six separate
temporary Federal programs. These temporary extensions have been controversial
because they raise a variety of questions about the optimal potential duration of
unemployment insurance (UI): Should the potential duration of benefits be linked to
labor market conditions, and if so, how should the link between potential duration and
labor market conditions be made? That is, how should extended benefits be activated
or "triggered"? Should the same eligibility conditions apply to extended benefits as to
regular benefits? Should extended benefits be financed differently than regular
benefits?
These questions about temporary benefit extensions have become increasingly
controversial since 1970, when Congress passed a permanent "stand-by" Extended
,Benefits program. In principle, the· EB program activates automatically when
unemployment durations rise in the wake of a recession. But, especially since the
'''triggers'' that activate EB were changed in the early 1980s, the EB program has
activated only infrequently. For example, EB activated in only 10 states during the
recession of the early-1990s, and never activated in some of the largest states that
were hard-hit by the recession, such as California, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania. As a result, four of the six temporary extensions

hav~

occurred since

implementation of the permanent EB program, and each successive temporary
extension has been increasingly complicated.
1
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This paper provides background 'and a review'of' some of the analytical issues
that arise in making policy on the potential duration ofUI benefits. Section I reviews
briefly the history of Federal extensions of unemployment 'insurance and illustrates the
increasing' complexity of each successive emergency benefit extension. Section II
provides a brief review of how the potential duration of benefits is determined under
regular state programs, since it is important to understand how potential durations are
set in state programs as a background to accessing extended benefit programs.
The main analytical issue surrounding emergency extensions of unemployment
benefits is whether (or to what extent) they create a' disincentive for workers to seek
reemployment, and hence lengthen spells of unemployment. Accordingly, the next
three sections of the report focus on various aspects of this issue. Section III reviews
the theoretical issues that arise in estimating the impact of extending the potential
duration of UI benefits, and discusses the main class of model that has been relied on
in grounding those empirical estimates.
Se9tion IV provides a critical review of the empirical techniques that have been
used to obtain estimates of the disincentive effects of increasing the potential duration
of unemployment, pointing up the strengths and weaknesses of the various
techniques. Section IV also provides a summary of the empirical estimates that have
been obtained in past· studies
Section V offers some new estimates .of the impact of increased potential benefit
duration on the duration of unemployment, using two data sets. In one of these data
sets -- from Washington State in 1988-89 -- variation in the potential duration of
benefits exists

becaus~

the state provides greater potential duration of benefits to

workers with stronger work

~istories.

In the other data set -- from Illinois in 1984-85 --

variation in the potential duration of benefits exists because an emergency benefit
extension program expired. This expiration allows a before-after comparison that
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yields an estimate of the impact of the emergency extension on the duration of
unemployment. These are the two types of variation .in potential duration of benefits
that have been the basis of most estimates of the disincentives of benefit extensions.
The main purpose of section V is to explore the sensitivity of the estimates to changes
in model specification, estimating technique, and source of variation in potential
benefit duration. The main question addressed is, How robust (or how fragile) are
estimates of the disincentive effects of extending the potential duration of
unemployment benefits?
Finally, section VI summarizes the main points and suggests some directions for
future research. The main conclusion, perhaps, is that most existing research has
avoided the difficult issue of testing the sensitivity of econometric estimates, tending
instead to put forward one or another rather fragile set of estimates as representing the
truth. In the process, many of the issues that are central to designing sensible and
defensible extended benefit programs have been side-stepped, and research has
focused instead on econometric issues that, while technically interesting, may yield
only a modest return to policy.

3
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I. A Brief History -of Federal Extended Benefit Programs

Currently, the maximum potential duration of unemployment benefits provided
to job losers by regular state programs is 26 weeks in all states except Massachusetts
and Washington (where the maximum potential duration is 30 weeks). In 10 states, the
potential duration of benefits is 26 weeks for all claimants who qualify for any benefits
(Illinois and New York are the only large states that provide such "uniform" potential
duration of benefits). In all other states, the potential duration of benefits varies with a
claimant's work experience in the base period -

roughly the year preceding the claim

for benefits. The ways in which "variable" potential duration states compute the
potential duration of benefits are described in section II below. The regular state
programs is sometimes referred to as the "first tier" of the UI system.
Table 1 provides a summary of the main features of the six Federal programs
that have temporarily extended the potential duration of unemployment benefits
beyond

t~e

duration provided by ·state programs. The permanent stand-by Extended

Benefit program is also summarized there. The stand-by EB program is often referred
to as the "second tier" of the UI system, and emergency extensions are collectively
referred to as the "third tier."
The first two Federal emergency benefit extensions -- Temporary
Unemployment Compensation (TUC) and Temporary Extended Unemployment
Compensation' (TEUC) _. were enacted in 1958 and 1961. They were similar in that
each lasted slightly over a year and extended the potential duration of benef!ts to
w'Jrkers who exhausted their regular state benefits by 50%, up to a maximum of 13
weeks. They differed, however, in that TUC was a voluntary program financed by
interest-free loans to 17 participating states. TEUC, on the other had, was mandatory
and was financed through increases in the Federal Unemployment Tax.

4
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· Nearly ten years after the first two emergency extended benefit programs,
Congress enacted the permanent stand-by Extended Benefit program (EB). EB was
modeled on TUG andTEUC in that it extends benefits to claimants who exhaust their
regular state benefits by an amount equal to one-half their regular benefit duration, up
to 13 weeks. Also, the weekly benefit amount is the same as the weekly benefit
amount under the regular state program. EB is financed half-and-half by Federal and
state revenues. It was originally activated either nationally by a "trigger" based on the
national insured unemployment rate, or on a state-specific basis by

state~level

insured unemployment rates. The Federal trigger activated the program whenever the
national insured unemployment rate reached 4 percent for a three-month period; the
state trigger activated the program whenever a state's insured unemployment rate
reached 4 percent for 13 consecutive weeks, and was at least 20 percent above the
average insured unemployment rate of the corresponding 13-week periods in the two
previous years.
As shown in Table 1, in 1980 and 1981, the national trigger was dropped and
the state-level trigger was raised from an insured unemployment rate of 4 percent to a
rate of 5 percent. Both changes made it less likely that EB would be activated in a
recession. Also, the amendments of the early-1980s made eligibility for EB more
restrictive -- the program now requires that workers have at least 20 weeks of work (or
the equivalent) in the base period to qualify for EB. Combined with falling insured
unemployment rates, which have resulted mainly from decreased participation in
unemployment insurance, the changes of 1981 led to a situation in which EB was·
nearly defunct by the time of the recession of the early 1990's. As already noted, EB
was activated in only 10 states during that recession and failed to activate in several
states where many observers felt labor market conditions were bad enough to warrant
it. In response to the failure of EB to be activated widely during the early-90's
5
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recession, Congress passed legislation allowing states to adopt an alternative trigger
based on the total unemployment rate (TUR) in 1993, although few states have
adopted the alternative trigger (see below). .
States were allowed to adopt EB as early as October 1970, and required to do
so no later than January 1972. But even before EB became available in all states,
Congress

~dopted

the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act (sometimes

called "Temporary Compensation" or "TC"), which. provided up to 13 weeks of
extended benefits to claimants who either exhausted EB or exhausted regular benefits
in states where EB was not available. Temporary Compensation was activated by
special triggers that differed from the stand-by EB triggers. It was financed from
Federal Unemployment Tax revenues in the Extended Unemployment Compensation
Account (EUCA). The program, which originally was set to run from January 1972 until
September 1972, was extended through March 1973.
During the severe recession of mid-1970s, the national EB trigger activated the
Extende~

Benefits in all states, permitting workers to receive up to 26 weeks regular

unemployment benefits followed by up to 13 weeks of EB. Nevertheless, the recession
was so severe that Congress enacted another emergency extension in January 1975
-- Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB), which provided up to 13 additional weeks of
benefits to those who exhausted regular benefits and EB.
In March 1975, the FSB program was extended and made more generous by
1

providing yet another 13 weeks of benefits. As a result of this and further extensions of
FSB, a claimant could receive up to 65 weeks of unemployment benefits for the period
March 1975 through March 1977 -

26 weeks of regular state benefits, 13 weeks of

EB, and 26 weeks of FSB.
In April, 1977, FSB was extended again (through January 1978), but the
potential duration of benefits was reduced to 13 weeks from May 1977 through the end

6
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of the program. This extension also added special federal disqualifications for refusal
of suitable work and failure to actively seek work, defined suitable work for the FSB
program, and added special penalty and repayment provisions for fraudulent acts on
the part of both claimants and employers. This was the first time such disqualifications
had been imposed as part of an emergency extension.
As already noted, Congress eliminated the national trigger for EB in 1980, and
increased the rate of insured unemployment needed to activate EB in a recession. In
additiQn. Congress changed the definition of insured unemployment to omit EB
claimants from the computation, and· imposed special eligibility and disqualifying
conditions on EB claimants. All of these changes reflected a changed attitude toward
extended benefits, one that suggested an intent by the new Reagan Administration
and Congress to reduce the cost of domestic programs. These changes clearly did
reduce the cost of EB -- indeed, they very nearly disabled the program. But ironically,
the parade of emergency unemployment benefit extensions continued.
In 1982, Congress enacted Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) as part
of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. FSC was different from
previous emergency extended benefit programs in that the number of weeks payable
in each state varied according to different criteria at different times. In fact, FSC went
through four "phases," each of which provided different potential benefit durations for
·each state depending on the state's labor market conditions (see Table 1, under
"potential duration of extended benefits provided"). Under Phase II, a UI claimant in a
high unemployment state could be eligible for up to 55 weeks of benefits -- 26 from the
regUlar state program, 13 from EB (assuming the state had triggered on), and 16 from
FSC.
Potential durations were somewhat shorter under Phases III and IV of FSC, but
the interstate differences in potential benefit durations remained. Under FSC, then,

7
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there was more tinkering (or, more charitably, greater effort to fine-tune the program)
than under previous emergency extensions in two senses. First, the idea that
emergency extensions should provide different potential benefit durations to different
states was wholly new -- even the stand-by EB program has never done this: Second,
four phases of FSC led to frequent changes in potential benefit duration and created
administrative difficulties for the states. Both of these aspects of FSC began to call into
question the roll of emergency extensions and seemed to be an admission that the
stand-by EB program was already defunct.
The most recent emergency extension of unemployment benefits, Emergency
Unemployment Compensation (EUC), was enacted in November 1991 after months of'
foot-dragging by the Bush Administration,

w~ich

had vetoed several earlier emergency

extensions. EUC was the most complicated emergency benefit extension of all: it went
through five phases, provided different potential durations across states at

a given

time, and different potential durations within a state over time (see Table 1). The
potential duration of benefits within a state could change either because of
Congressional fiat (that is, a change from one phase to the next), or because a state
changed its classification as either high-unemployment or low-unemployment. By all
accounts, EUC was a UI administrator's nightmare. In Pennsylvania, for example, the
potential duration of benefits changed nine times between November 1991 when EUC
became effective and February 1994 when Phase V of EUC terminated. Five of these
changes resulted from enactment of EUC or a change from one phase to another, and
four resulted because Pennsylvania was reclassified as high- or low-unemployment.
At one point, Congress let EUC lapse, but sUbsequently resuscitated it, and during the
hiatus, state administrators were left hanging.
During Congressional debate on whether to extend EUC, Republicans in
Congress argued that if Congress continued its pattern of enacting emergency

8

JJ-I0

extensions whenever the economy went into recession, then there would be no
incentive for the states to switch to the new alternative EB trigger, based on the total
unemployment rate (TUR). The old insured unemployment rate trigger, as already
discussed, has been ineffective since the early-1980s and rarely moves a state onto
EB, whereas the alternative TUR trigger would be more effective. But states naturally
prefer to have the Federal government step in and provide emergency benefits, since
financing of emergency benefits is wholly Federal, rather than 50-50 state-Federal as
with EB. As long as the states can argue that EB is not providing adequate benefit
durations, they can reasonably urge Congress to enact emergency extensions. And as
long as Congress accommodates the states in enacting emergency extensions, the
states have no incentive to switch to the alternative TUR trigger, which would be more
effective but would also result in greater benefit payments from the state UI trust funds.
A cynic might argue that Congress really does not want the stand-by EB
program to work effectively -- that members would prefer to step in and enact an
emergency program whenever the economy slumps. An emergency program shows
that Congress has /ldone something" in an economic downturn and offers the
politicians a concrete program to point to when they stand for reelection. Such a
cynical view is not wholly unrealistic. Congress could require the states to switch to the
~Iternative

TUR trigger, but it has not done so.

The future of the EB program and emergency extensions is highly unclear at
this time. Congress seems to pay attention to the Unemployment Insurance System
only when there is a recession, so the role of politics would seem to be more important
than the role of policy analysis in determining the future of extended benefits. It

ne~ds

to be noted that very little effort has been devoted to understanding what is (or would
be) the socially optimal potential duration of benefits, or to analyzing the extent to
which that optimal potential duration should change with changing labor market

9
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conditions. These gaps, convincingly addressed, could have an impact on policy and
the future direction of unemployment insurance in this country.
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II. How States Determine the Potential Duration of Benefits

From the- beginning of the UI program in the United States, the generally
accepted goal has been to provide a limited number of weeks of benefits, payable only
long enough to tide an unemployed worker and household over a temporary spell of
unemployment. Consensus on the meaning of "temporary" has changed -- from 15
weeks, which was the most common potential duration at the beginning of the program
in 1935, to 26 weeks, which is the maximum in all but two states today.
The apparent consensus that 26 weeks is a reasonable duration of benefits
masks considerable variation among the states in how the duration of benefits is
determined. Some states provide the same duration of benefits to all eligible
claimants, whereas others vary benefit duration with the extent of a claimant's past
employment or wages. Accordingly, there are substantial differences among the states
in the amount of prior work or wages required to qualify for different benefit durations.
Table 2 provides a summary of the methods used by the states to determine the
potential duration of benefits. As can be seen in the first two columns, nine states
currently provide the same potential duration of benefits to all who meet the minimum
qualifying requirement (that is, the minimum and maximum potential durations are the
same). These 'are usually referred to as uniform duration states. The number of states
providing uniform duration has fallen over the years, as Blaustein (1993, Tabl~ 10.7, 'p.
304) has shown.
The other 44 states vary potential duration according to each claimant's past .
employment or earnings. These states use one of two methods to Gompute potential
duration. In 6 states -- Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Pennsylvania -- potential duration is an increasing function of the number of "credit"
weeks worked (or wages, in the case of Oklahoma) in the base period, up to the

11

maximum 26 weeks. A credit week is a week in which earnings equaled or exceeded
some specified minimum, so that,
0pot = min [f(credit weeks), 26],

(2.1 )

where 0pot denotes the potential duration of UI benefits and f is a function increasing
in credit weeks. For example, in Florida, a credit week is a week. in which a worker
earned at least $20, and potential duration equals one-half the number of credit
weeks. 1 It follows that, in order to be eligible for the maximum potential duration of 26
weeks of benefits, a worker must have 52 credit weeks; that is, the worker must have
worked in every week of the base period.
In 38 states, the potential duration of benefits depends on the ratio of a
claimants' base-period earnings to high-quarter earnings, up to the maximum 26
weeks. If we let BPE denote base period earnings and HOE denote high-quarter
earnings, then,
(2.2)

Dpot

=min [ f(BPEIHQE), 26],

where f denotes a function increasing in BPEIHQE. Note that BPEIHQE ranges from 1
for a worker all of whose base period earnings' were earned in a single quarter (BPE

=

HOE for such a worker) to 4 for a worker who had identical earnings in all four quarter
'(BPE = 4[HOE]). The idea here is that a worker with stable earnings throughout the
base period will have a higher BPEIHOE and hence a higher potential duration of UI
benefits.
In 5 states, the relationship between BPEIHOE and potential duration is explicit.
For example, in North Carolina, potential duration is simply 8.67 times BPEIHOE (up to
26 weeks), so that a UI-eligible worker with BPEIHOE of 3 or greater is eligible for the
maximum potential duration of 26 weeks of benefits.
In 33 states, however, the relationship between BPEIHOE and potential
1 In Florida, a worker must have at least 20 weeks in which there were earnings of at least $20 to be eligible
for any UI benefits, so the minimum potential duration of UI benefits is 10 weeks.

12
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duration is masked by the formula used to calculate potential duration. In these states,
potential duration is calculated as some fraction a of base period earnings divided by
the weekly benefit amount (WBA), up to the maximum:
Dpot = min[ a(BPE)I\J\IBA; 26].

(2.3)

The parameter a limits the total UI benefits paid .to a worker in the benefit year to some
fraction of base period earnings. In 18 states,

a = 1l3,and in the other 15, a ranges

between .25 and .6. What needs to be noted is that in all of these states the weekly
benefit amount is computed in turn as

a fraction of high-quarter earnings (or in some

cases, average earnings in the two highest quarters of the base period) up to some
maximum:
WBA = min [ b(HQE), WBAmax].

(2.4)

Typically, b is 1/25 (.04), so that the weekly benefit amount equals one-half of average
weekly earnings in the high quarter. [The parameter b ranges from 1/26 (.038) to 1120
(.05) in these 33 states.] Substituting the WBA equation (2.4) into the potential duration
function (3) yields:
(2.5a)

0pot = a(BPE)Jb(HOE),

if WBA < WBAmax ,

0pot = a(BPE)!WBAmax,

if WBA

,

•

or
'(2.5b)

=WBAmax.

.It follows that for eligible claimants whose WBA is less than the state's maximum,
(2.6)

0pot = g(BPEIHQE),

where
(2.7)

g = alb,

so the dependence of potential duration on BPE/HOE is clear for claimants whose
WBA is below the maximum. For claimants whose WBA is at the maximum, potential
duration will still depend on the relationship between base period and high-quarter

13
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earnings. For example, a worker who obtains the maximum WBA as a result of high
earnings in just one quarter may have potential duration below the maximum 26 (or
30) weeks, since base period earnings will be low relative to the weekly benefit
amount for such a worker.
The parameter g can be usefully interpreted as an index of a state's duration
generosity. Specifically, it gives the increase the number of weeks of potential duration
that result from a unit increase in BPEIHQE. In Table 2, g has been computed for all 53
"states" (that is, UI jurisdictions). For states that do explicitly use the parameters a or b
in computing the potential duration of benefits, an implied g has been calculated
numerically.
Table 2, also displays the minimum base period earnings and high-quarter
earnings that an eligible claimant would need in order to receive the state's maximum
potential duration of benefits.
An examination of g and the minimum earnings required for maximum potential .
duration in Table 2 shows that the variations in states'. duration provisions are
significant. Claimants with similar base-period work experience qualify for quite
different potential durations depending on the state in which they reside, and the
~equirements ~or

26 weeks of regular benefits vary

dramatical~y

among the states. For

example, to qualify for 26 weeks of regular benefits requires as little as $130 in the
base period (and $33 to $105 in the high-quarter) in Hawaii to as much as $18,757 in
the base period (and $4 800 in the high quarter) in Indiana.
1

Variable duration reflects the notion that workers "earn" their rights to benefits
by working, and that each week of

~enefits

is earned by a given number of weeks of

employment or earnings. The widespread use of variable duration also reflects two
further concerns: first, that uniform duration is more expensive than variable duration,
and second, that uniform duration can generate a high ratio of total benefits paid to
14
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base period earnings, which could in turn lead to strong work disincentives. 2 These
issues are explored further below.

See Advisory Council on Unemployment COmpensation (1995, p. 129) for a discussion replacement
rates based on the administrative records of siX states. Although the AeUe discussion is based on a
different definition of the replacement rate (the ratio of weekly benefits to average base period earnings)
than the definition used in the text, it does suggest that benefit durations in excess of base period
. employment durations would imply strong work disincentives.
2
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-III. Theoretical Issues

Most estimates of the effects of both benefit duration and benefit amounts on the
duration of joblessness have been based on one or another model of job search (see
Mortensen 1986 for

a review)3. The job search models provide a theoretical link

between the duration of joblessness, on the one hand, and job-search intensity,
individual characteristics, and labor market conditions, on the other. It is useful to
review a general job-search model as a prelude to the empirical work that is reviewed
and developed below.
Let T denote the week in which a UI recipient returns to work, and let Pt denote
the probability that a UI recipient returns to

wo~k

in week t, given that she has not

already returned to work by then; that is, Pt= Pr[T=tIT~t]. Then Pt can be expressed as
the product of (a) the probability of receiving a job offer in week t and (b) the probability
of accepting that job offer, given that an offer has been made. The probability of
receiving an job offer in week t (Jt> depends on the intensity of the worker's job search
(i) and a vector of characteristics of the worker that determine the demand for the

worker's labor (c); that is, Jt = Jt(i,c). The probability of offer acceptance (At) depends
on whether the offered wage (wO ) equals or exceeds the worker's reservation wage
(w r); that is, At = Pr[wO~w"Jt1. Hence, the probability of finding reemployment during.
week t (given that reemployment has not already occurred) can be expressed as:
(3.1)

Pt

=Jt(i,c) At.

The income-leisure model developed by Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) is also appealing because of its
link to well-known principles of consumer theory, but it has been the baSis of relatively little empirical work.
One reason may be that the income-leisure model implicitly views unemployment as compensated leisure,
and views the combination of income and leisure (that is, unemployment) as chosen by the worker subject
to the constraints posed by the available wage rate and the UI system. Since the extent to which
unemployment is voluntary is itself an important question, a model that assumes that unemployment is
voluntary may be rather uninformative.
3
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Pt has been defined in discrete time above. In the limit, as the time interval over
which reemployment is measured approaches zero, Pt becomes an instantaneous
rate of reemployment, or hazard rate, h(t). The hazard rate is linked to unemployment
duration in the following way. If t has cumulative distribution F(t), and frequency
distribution f(t), then h(t) = f(t)1[1 - F(t)] = f(t)/S(t), where S(t) is the so-called survivor
function, or the probability of being unemployed to time t (Lancaster' 1979). The
survivor function can also be expressed in terms of the hazard: S(t) =f(t)lh(t). Thus, the
hazard rate is inversely related to the survival probability, and any factor that increases
the hazard rate should decrease expected unemployment duration.
Equation (3.'1) highlights the fact that longer spells of joblessness can result
from less-intense job search,' from individual characteristics (c) that imply lower
demand for a worker's services, or ,from a lower probability of jo~ffer acceptance.
From the point of view of work disincentives, the probability of offer acceptance, At, and
the intensity of job search, i, are central, since they depend on the generosity and
potential duration of UI benefits.

17
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IV. Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits and
the Duration of Joblessness: Models and Existing Estimates

Since the mid-1970s, the most-researched question about the Unemployment
Insurance (UI) system has been whether and to what degree higher weekly UI-benefit
amounts lengthen UI recipients' jobless spells. But an equally important and
under-researched question is how the potential duration of those benefits influences
the length of jobless spells. The latter question is important fo(two reasons. First, as
already discussed, Congress has legislated six temporary or emergency extended
UI-benefit programs since the 1950s, making the potential duration of UI benefits a
highly variable aspect of the UI system. Second, as will become clear, econometric
r

problems make inferences about the influence of UI-benefit extensions on the
expected length of UI recipients' jobless spells especially tenuous.
This section offers a summary of the evidence on the disincentives effects of
extending the potential duration of benefits by an additional week. Rather than simply
provide a range of estimates, though, an effort is made to provide some insight into the
quality of. the existing evidence.. Subsection A begins with a discussion of the
problems that arise in using censored data, which has generally been used in
obtaining estimates of the disincentives of unemployment insurance. Subsection B
then reviews several models that have been used to infer the effects of extended
benefits

~-

a simple linear duration model,a parametric jobless duration model that

accounts for censoring of

the~

dependent variable and non-normality of the error term,

and a semi-parametric model of the conditional probability (or hazard) of returning to
work. Subsection B also summarizes the estimates that have been derived from each
of the models.

18
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A. Censoring Problems

Most analyses of the effe9ts of potential benefit duration on jobless duration
have used claims and benefits data from UI administrative files. These data are
extremely rich: For example, they usually contain demographic data on claimants, the
dates of their UI claims, and the amount and timing of benefits received. But claims
and benefits data from UI administrative files are usually deficient in that they exclude
any inf.ormation on the subsequent earnings of claimants. Hence, they fail to offer

~ata

on actual spells of unemployment. Rather, they indicate only the duration of insured
unemployment experienced by a claimant.
In some data sets -- including both the Illinois and Washington State data used
in section V, this deficiency can be overcome to some extent by using data from
Unemployment Insurance Wage Records, which contain information on the earnings
histories of workers both before and after their spell of insured unemployment. By
matching a claimant's Wage Records to his or her claims and benefits data, it is
possible to determine whether a spell of insured unemployment was followed by a
period of earnings. If the observed spell of insured unemployment was followed by a
period of earnings, then it can be inferred that the· insured spell and the actual spell of
joblessness were the same. On the other hand, if the insured spell was not followed by

.

a spell of earnings, the insured spell must be considered a censored or truncated
measure of the actual spell of joblessness.
It was rare for early studies of the disincentive effects of UI to make use of Wage
Records, as will be done in Section V below. As a result, existing research using
administrative data has necessarily taken a different approach to

dra~ing

inferences

about actual spells of joblessness from observations on insured unemployment spells.
First, because the number of weeks of unemployment that can be observed in
19
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Neither of these assumptions is necessarily correct, as can be seen in Table 3,
which uses a random sample of administrative data on male UI recipients in Illinois'
during

1984~85

to illustrate four cases, labeled A through 0. 4 Cases A and B are those

of workers who received the maximum p()tential weeks of UI benefits-that is, .
exhausted their benefits. It is possible for such workers to return to work immediately
after receiving their last benefit payment (Case A), or to continue to be out of covered
employment (Case B, which implies either continuing to seek employment or dropping
out of the labor force after receiving the last benefit payment).5 The usual assumption is
that all workers who exhaust benefits continue without covered employment, as in
Case B. But the right-most column of Table 3 showsthat this assumption is incorrect
for nearly 40 percent of the workers who exhausted their benefits in this sample. That
is, 283 of the 717 workers who exhausted their benefits returned to work immediately
(or very shortly) after receiving their last benefit payment.
It is also possible to misclassify a worker who did not exhaust his or her
benefits. Cases C and 0 in Table 3 are for workers who received fewer than the
potential weeks of benefit payments. Again, the usual assumption is that all such
The data are for men in the control group of the Illinois Reemployment Bonus experiment. These data
are described further in section V, where they are used further.
5 Obtaining uncovered (usually underground) employment and moving out of state are additional
possibilities.
4
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workers returned to work immediately after'they stopped receiving benefits, as in Case
C. But the right-most column shows that 405 (or 28 percent) of the 1,445 workers who
ended their benefits before exhausting did not return to covered employment. 6
The problems of using censored data to infer the effects of extended UI benefits
on expected unemployment duration can also be illustrated using the Illinois data that
underlie Table 3. About one-half of the' sample used in Table 3 was drawn before
expiration of Phase IV of the Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) program in
late 1984, and the other half was drawn after FSC expired. Phase IV of FSC in Illinois
provided an additional 12 weeks of potential benefits· to initial claimants who satisfied
the usual state eligibility criteria plus a somewhat more stringent monetary eligibility
criterion that was specific to FSC. 7 As a result, the workers sampled, all of whom were
eligible for regUlar state benefits, can be divided into four categories: (a) those who
were eligible for FSC because they met the additional monetary eligibility criteria for
FSC and filed their initial UI cla.im while FSC was still in effect; (b) those who were
monetarily eligible for FSC, but claimed benefits too late to actually receive FSC; (c)
those who were monetarily ineligible for FSC and filed their initial claim before FSC
expired; and (d) those who were monetarily ineligible for FSC, and filed their initial
~Iaim

after FSC ~xpired.
Table 4 shows the

me~n

insured unemployment duration for each of these four

.

groups. The expiration of FSC appears to offer a natural experiment. ,The mean
unemployment duration of workers eligible for FSC (21.4 weeks) can be compared
with the mean unemployment duration of workers monetarily eligible but temporally
ineligible because they filed after FSCexpired (17.9 weeks). As a quasi-eontrol, .the
mean unemployment duration of workers who were monetarily ineligible but who filed
Most likely, these workers either dropped out of the labor force or took uncovered employment,
although it is possible that they stopped participating in UI and continued to seek employment. There is
no way of distinguishing between the two possibilities in the administrative data.
7 That is, not all UI claimants who were monetarily eligible for regular state benefits were also monetarily
eligible for FSC.
.
6
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for

ben~fits

while FSC was still in effect (16.5 weeks) can be compared with the mean

unemployment duration of workers who were neither monetarily nor temporally
eligible (20.1 weeks).
Two comparisons are shown in the bottom row of Table 4 (labeled "Difference").
The difference between the two groups of monetarily eligible workers, 3.5 weeks,
suggests that FSC prolonged unemployment spells significantly.

Moreover, the

difference between the two groups of monetarily ineligible workers, -3.5 (with a large
standard error), suggests that there was no underlying macroeconomic or other
reason for expecting unemployment spells to be longer after the expiration of FSC.
The conclusion would seem to be that workers eligible for FSC tended to take over
three weeks longer to return to work than did workers who were not eligible for FSC.
Such 'an inference would clearly be wrong, though, because the claims and
benefits data make it impossible to observe more than 26 weeks of unemployment
among FSC-ineligibles, whereas we can observe up to 38 weeks of unemployment.
among FSC-eligibles. The truncation or censoring of unemployment spells at the
maximum potential duration leads to a situation in which the two group means cannot
be compared. To take Moffitt's (1985a) extreme example, every worker in each of the
two groups might have an actual spell of joblessness of 30 weeks, but we would
observe an average of 26 weeks for the first group (because the data are censored at
26 weeks) and 30 weeks for the second (because censoring occurs only at 38 weeks).
It may still be the case that FSC tended to lengthen jobless spells, but the data in
Table 4 cannot be used to make such an inference.
In the presence of censoring, quasi-experimental comparisons like those
presented in Table 4 fail to yield reliable estimates of the. effects of extended benefits
on jobless duration. Hence, other methods of inference must be considered.
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B. Models of Unemployment Duration and Reemployment Hazard

Estimates of how potential benefit" duration affects the expected duration of
joblessness have progressed through three stages. This section outlines the approach
represented by each of these stages and summarizes past studies that have used
each of the methods. Table 5 provides a synopsis of the various studies that are
referred to.

1. Linear Models of Insured Unemployment Duration. The earliest empirical
work on the effects of potential duration on expected jobless duration simply
regressed the duration of insured unemployment in weeks (0), or the natural logarithm
of weeks of unemployment on appropriate explanatory variables (X1, ... , XK), including
measures of the replacement ratio and potential duration of benefits:
(4.1)

0 = ao + a1x1 + ... +aKxK + u,

where u is assumed to be a normally distributed disturbance

~erm.

The coefficients of

X1 through XK provide an estimate of the relationship between the explanatory
variables and weeks of insured unemployment. Studies taking this approach include
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), and Holen (1977), among others; however, only Holen
estimated the effect of additional weeks of benefit entitlement. Her estimates suggest
that a 1-week increase in the potential duration of benefits increases unemployment
. duration by about .8 week -- a very high estimate.

It seems unlikely that such estimates can be relied on for convincing
assessments of the behavioral impact of an additional week of benefit entitlement on
the duration of unemployment. The model used takes no account of censoring in the
data, so that any measured impact of longer benefit entitlement could simply be the
result of the ability to observe more weeks of unemployment for workers whose benefit
entitlement is longer, as discussed in section A above. The estimates provided by such
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studies do provide accurate descriptive evidence on

~xtended

benefits. That is, they

they do' give an unbiased and consistent estimate of the average weeks of extra
benefit payments that are paid to workers. who receive an additional week of benefit
entitlement. But this descriptive estimate cannot be used to infer how an increase in
the potential duration of benefits would change the behavior of workers. As a result the
descriptive estjmate cannot be used to predict how unemployment durations wouid
increase if benefits were extended.
2. Parametric Models of Time to Reemployment. The problem with applying
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to equation (4.1) is that the error them u in the equation
is not normal, as 0LS requires. There are two reasons for this. First, as already
discussed, 0 is a censored measure of actual jobless duration, since each worker is
eligible for a specified maximum number of weeks of benefits. As a result, the
distribution of 0 is truncated at the maximum Ibenefit duration. Realization of this
problem lead to some studies that assumed that the underlying distribution of jobless
spells is

nor~al,

and assumed in turn that the distribution of u in equation (4.1) is

truncated normal. For example, Classen (1979) and Newton and Rosen (1979) both
used Tobit analysis-which assumes that u has the truncated normal distribution -

to

correct for the truncation of the dependent variable. Classen's estimates suggest that
an additional week of potential benefit duration leads to at most an additional O. 12
week of insured unemployment, whereas Newton and Rosen's estimates suggest an
"

additional .6 week (see Table 5).
The second reason for questioning the assumption that u in equation (4. 1) is
normal is that the empirical frequency distribution of weeks of insured unemployment
in most data is not bell-shaped, as the normality assumption requires. Rather, it shows
one spike at zero weeks of unemployment, and falling frequencies for greater,
unemployment durations, until a'spike appears where censoring occurs (that is, at

24

JJ-26

maximum benefit duration.) Except for the spike at the censoring point, the empirical
distribution looks much Hke an inverse exponential. This latter problem can be solved
in a jobless-duration equation like (4.1) .by making an appropriate assumption about
the distribution of u, and estimating equation (4.1) under that alternative distributional
assumption. The Weibull distribution has been widely assumed in studies of jobless
duration because it provides an approximation to the empirical distribution of jobless
duration that appears to be valid (Lancaster 1979). (The exponential distribution is a
speci~1

case of the WeibulL

Whereas the exponential restricts the

conditi~nal

probability that a UI recipient will become reemployed (Pt, or the hazard rate) to be
constant over the spell of unemployment, theWeibull allows for the possibility that a UI
recipient's probability of reemployment rises or falls over the spell. The greater
generality of the Weibull distribution makes it the preferred choice.)
Several studies have imposed a more appropriate distributional assumption on
u in equation (4.1) to examine the effects of potential benefit duration on the length of
unemployment spells. These studies have obtained estimates suggesting that an
additional week of benefit entitlement increases the duration of unemployment by
about .2 to .4 week." For example, Katz and Dchs (1980) estimate that an additional
week of benefit entitlement increases the. duration of unemployment by .17-.23 week.
Moffitt (1985b) estimates an additional .45 week for men and an additional .28 week
for women using a 15-state sample. Using Georgia data, he obtains an estimate of .17
week for men and .37 for women. Solon (1985) also uses Georgia data and estimates
that an additional week of potential benefit duration leads to 0.36 additional weeks of
insured unemployment.
Such estimates are far more convincing than those based on. Ordinary Least
Squares, in that they take account of the censoring of data and make a defensible
assumption about the distribution of unemployment spells. Nevertheless, they have
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been criticized for imposing any distributional assumption, and because they are
unable to take account of factors that change during a spell of unemployment and that
may influence the ultimate duration of unemployment
3. Semi-Parametric Hazard Models. The two problems just mentioned cannot
be handled in either of the duration modeling frameworks discussed to this point.
They are impQrtant enough to discuss in somewhat more detail. The first is that the
duration models force an assumption about the distribution of the error term u in
equation (4.1). Incorrect distributional assumptions may yield misleading inferences
about the effects of extended benefits. For example, the Weibull seems a good
approximation to the empirical distribution of jobless spells as long as it is true that the'
spike in the empirical distribution in the week following benefit exhaustion results from
censored data. But if the distribution of jobless spells shows a true spike in the week
following benefit exhaustion-that is, if workers tend to put off finding taking a job until
just after their benefits terminate-then the Weibull is a poor choice. Ideally, -one
would like to, impose no distributional assumption at all.
The second problem is that some variables may change during a worker's spell
of joblessness. For example, the number of weeks until exhaustion of benefits can be
thought of as a variable that decreases weekly. There is no way of understanding the
effects of such "time-varying" explanatory variables in a duration model.
To analyze the effects of time-varying explanatory variables and to avoid any
assumptions about the distribution of jobless spells requires reconceptualizing the
duration problem as a problem of rate of escape from joblessness. In other words,
rather than regress some measure of duration In various explanatory variables, one
could regress a dummy variable (At) equal to one if a worker escaped from
unemployment in week t (zero otherwise) on various explanatory variables, some of
which are time-invariant (X1, ... , xK),and others which are time-varying (Z1 (t), ... , ZN(t».
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If e is assumed to have the logistic distribution, then we have a log it model, which is preferred to a linear
probability model because it yields, consistent, and efficient coefficient estimates. In practice, legit
estimates of equation (4.2) are virtually identical in statistical significance and quantitative response to
changes- in explanatory variables to linear probability estimates.

8
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generated by the three claimant records in Panel A. The first claimant contributes a
total of 6 observations to the claimant-week data set-one for the waiting week, one
for each week in which UI benefits were received, and one more for the week following
the spell of insured unemployment, Since this worker .became reemployed. The
dependent variable in the hazard analysis, reemployment, is zero in all weeks except
the last, in which reemployment occurred. The second claimant contributes 39
observations to the claimant-week data set-one for the waiting week, and one for
each week in which Ulbenefits were received. The reemployment variable is zero for
all of these observations, and since this claimant 'did not find reemployment after
exhausting his UI benefits, there is no fortieth observation following the spell of insured
unemployment in which the reemployment variable equals one. Note that, when
claimant records are transformed into claimant-week records, each claimant
contributes exactly as much information as is known about him or her to the analysis of
reemployment probability (Allison 1982).
Hazar<:~

models such as (4.2) start from the pioneering work of Cox (1972), and

are often referred to as "semiparametric" because they implicitly make no assumption
about the distribution of

~

in the duration equation (4.1). Studies that have estimated

hazard models such as (4.2) that also provide estimates of the effects of increases in
potential benefit duration on jobless duration include Moffitt (198'5a, 1985b), Ham and
Rea (1987), Grossman (1989), and Katz and Meyer (1990). The estimates provided by
these studies are wide-ranging: The estimates in Moffitt (1985a, 1985b) and Katz and
Meyer (1990) suggest that a on€rweek addition to potential duration leads to an
increase in unemployment duration of only .15 to .2 week. Ham and Rea's (1987)
estimate of .26-.35 week is somewhat higher. Grossman's (1989) estimate of .9 week,
derived from Phase IV of FSC, is the highest of all.
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V. How Robust Are the Estimates? Some Exploratory Findings

.The estimates of the impact of extending UI benefits reviewed above are based
<?n different estimating techniques, various data sources, and various specifications of
the incentives (or disincentives) facing UI claimants. The estimates vary widely, from
virtually no impact of extending the potential duration of benefits to an increase in
unemployment duration of .9 week for each additional week of benefit eligibility.. This is
a disturbingly wide range of. estimates. In order to get a better understanding of how
robust (or how fragile) these estimates are, this section reports results from two data
sets that are typical of the data used in the studies reviewed above. The ·first· are data
from the Washington Reemployment Bonus experiment, which was conducted during
1988-89, and was evaluated using administrative data from the Washington State
Unemployment Insurance system (see Spiegelman, Q'Leary,and Kline 1991 for a full
description). The advantage of using the Washington data is that Washington is a
variable duration state -- that is, the potential duration of UI benefits depends on the
earnings history of workers during their base period, and varies from a low of 10
weeks toa high of 30 weeks. 9 Since many estimates of how the potential duration of
benefits affects unemployment come from data in which the main source of variation in
potential duration occurs within-state (that is, under a given "regime" of potential
duration), it seems useful to explore the extent to which various model specifications
yield different findings in such a setting. The workers examined below are the 9,982
Ul-eligible claimants who filed valid claims and were assigned either to the control
group or to one of three treatments that offered low bonuses and had on impact on
behavior.
9 The distribution of potential durations is highly skewed in Washington: Less than 1 percent of eligible
claimants have potential duration of 16 or fewer weeks; about 15 percent are eligible for 17 to 21 weeks
(about 3 percent each for 17, 18, 19,20, and 21 weeks); about 28 percent are eligible for 22 to 28 weeks
(about 4 percent each for 23,24,25,26,27, and 28 weeks); about 5 percent are eligible for 29 weeks,
and 51 percent are eligible for 30, weeks.
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The second data set used is from the Illinois Reemployment Bonus experiment,
which was conducted during 1984-85, and like the Washington experiment, was
evaluated using administrative records of the State of illinois Unemployment
Insurance system (see Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987 for a complete description).
The advantage of the Illinois data is that they span the expiration of one of the the
emergency UI benefit extensions -- the Federal Supplemental Compensation program
(FSC), which expired about half-way into the enrollment period of the Illinois bonus
experiment. In Illinois, Phase IV of FSC provided 12 weeks of Federal benefit eligibility
on top of the 26 weeks of regular state benefit eligibility that Illinois provides (Illinois is
a uniform duration state). Consequently, the Illinois data permit one to compare the
jobless spells of workers who were eligible for FSC (that is, were eligible for a total of
38 weeks of benefits, and knew this at the time they filed their initial claim) with the
spells of workers who were eligible for only 26 weeks of benefits, but who would have
been eligible for an additional 12 weeks if they had become unemployed and filed for
benefits only one to six weeks earlier.
It is. important to remark that, although FSC was terminated by Congress
'because national labor market conditions had improved following the severe
recession of the early 1980s, it did not "trigger off!' as the standing Extended Benefits
program would have done. That is, whereas EB would have triggered off when specific
. conditions in Illinois had improved, FSC ended by Congressional fiat and in response
·f

to the impression that labor m.arket conditions nationwide no longer required a Federal
emergency benefit program. Accordingly, the expiration of FSC provides a "natural
experiment" and an alternative method of making inferences about the independent
contribution of potential benefit duration to the length of a jobless spell -- one that
might be more convincing than inferences from data where potential duration is
correlated with work history (as in the Washington data). The workers examined below
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are the 7,443 UI-eligible claimants who filed valid claims and were assigned to either
the control or Employer experimental groups of the experiment 10
Both the Washington and the Illinois data are typical of the data used in past
studies of the effects of extended benefits on the duration of unemployment because
they are administrative data-that is, data gathered and maintained by agencies
responsible for administering the UI program. But both the Washington and the Illinois
data include both earnings history data, which allow an improved classification of
jobless. spells as complete or censored. 11 Most of the studies described and reviewed
.
in section IV had to impose what appear to be erroneous assumptions about whether
a spell of insured unemployment represents a complete or censored spell of
joblessness. The consequences of this issue were discussed above in secti,on

IV~A.

A. Potential Duration and Unemployment in a Variable Duration State: Washington

1. Estimates from Duration Models. Table 7A displays the results of' ~stim~tin9'

various specifications of model (4.1) using the Washington State data. In

~ach

case

the dependent variable is the natural log of the weeks of benefits paid to the claimant
during the benefit year. Hence, the models are flawed in that they fail to account for
censoring of the dependent variable and impose the assumption of log-normality on
the dependent variable. Although the latter is an improvement over assuming
normality, assum'ing a Weibull or inverse exponential distribution would be an

The Employer bonus experiment had no measured impact on behavior. Hence, including it in the
analysis provides a way of increasing the sample size. As it turns out, the basic results would be the same if
only the Control group were examined.
11 Because these are administrative data, there is no way of distinguishing unemployment from out-of-the
labor force status for workers who have no earnings afterthe spell of insured unemployment ends.
Accordingly, I refer to the duration of joblessness (meaning either unemployment or out-of-Iabor force
status) and the probability of return to work.
10
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improvement (this is done below).12
The point of the estimates displayed in

Tabl~

7A is to explore the sensitivity of

estimates of the effects of the potential duration of benefits to various specifications of
the incentives facing UI claimants. Columns 1 through 4 use two different measures of
the replacement rate, along with base period .earnings, to characterize the
disincentiv~s to

reemployment faced by UI recipients. Columns 5 through 7 use a

combination of the weekly benefit amount and base period earnings to characterize
those disincentives, and columns 8 through 10 use a specification suggested by
Welsh (1977) and implemented by Classen (1979). Welsh's suggestion was to include
earnings in the two ,high-quarters of the base period (the amount from which the'
weekly benefit amount is calculated) and the amount by which earnings in the two
high quarters exceed, the amount that would give a claimant the maxim urn weekly
benefit amount. His argument is that there is no independent information contained in
the weekly benefit amount, base period earnings, or the replacement rate that is not
contained in these two variables.
Two other aspects of the models estimated need to be noted. First, a "recall"
variable is included, which equals one if the claimant was reemployed by the same
~mployer after

the spell of insured unemployment as before. Also, the recall variable is

interacted with the potential duration of benefits, 0 pot, so that differences in the impact
of potential benefit duration that might arise between workers on temporary layoff and
others can be' estimated. Second, a measure of earnings variability -- the standard
deviation of each worker's four quarterly earnings amounts -- is added to some
specifications (or substituted for 0pot in some cases). Since less earnings variability is
12 Note that a variety of control variables, which are of secondary importance for present purposes, have
also been included in the model: a~~(4 dummies), gender, ethnicity (4 dummies), the number of referrals
received by,
,p1oyment Service, the number of employers that the claimant worked
for dUring the base period, geographic location (20 dummies),and industry of employment befor~ job loss
(10 dummies).
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precisely what leads to longer potential duration of benefits -- as shown in- section II
above -- some control for earnings variability is required in order t<;> ensure -that the
.

.

potential duration variable does not merely reflect greater earnings stability during the
base .period.
Table 7A's estimates of the impact of an additional week of benefit eligibility on
the duration of unemployment range from' a low of .7 percent (specification 8) to a high
of 2.8 percent for workers who are not recalled to their pre-layoff employer
(specifications 1 and 3).13 Since the sample mean of the dependent variable is 16.13
weeks, this range amounts to an increase in the duration of unemployment of between
.11 and .45 week as a result of an additional week of benefit eligibility. This spans the
range of a large number of the estimates summarized in Table 5. A rather striking
implication of this result is that a fairly wide range of estimates of the disincentive
effects of an additional week of benefits can be obtained simply by manipulating the
way benefit levels are entered in an estimating equation.
Note that controlling for earnings variability in the base period does not reduce
the estimated impact of an additional week of benefit eligibility (columns 3, 4,7, and
10). In fact, just the opposite is true. The highest estimates of the impact of an
additional week of benefit eligibility come from the specifications that include the
replacement rate that is based on base period earnings (columns 1 and 3). If we·
discount this estimate, we can narrow the range of estimates from between .,1.1 and .45
week to between .11 and .29 week.
The estimates in Table 7A are all based on a flawed estimating method, as
already noted. The estimates displayed in Table 78 are intended to show the extent to
which different estimating techniques yield different answers to questions about the
impact of increased potential duration of benefits. Columns 1 and 2 display linear OLS
13 Since the specification is semi-logarithmic. the coefficients can be interpreted· as' the percentage
change in the dependent variable induced by a unit change in the respective independent variable.
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estimates of two insured unemployment 'duration' models -- the first controls for the
weekly benefit amount and base period earnings (as did specifications 5 through 7 in
Table 7A); the second is the Welch-Classen specification described above
(specifications 8 through 10 in Table 7A). Columns 3 and 4 in Table7A display the
same two models, but this time estimated with the natural "log Of the weeks of benefits
paid as tJ1e dependent variable. (These estimates are identical to those already
displayed in cOlumns 7 and 10 of Table7A.) Finally, COlumns 5 and 6 show the results
of estimating the two models with a correction for censoring of the dependent variable
and with the assumption that the underlying distribution of unemployment spells in
characterized by the Weibull distribution. This is the parametric model of time to
reemployment that was discussed in section IV.
The estimates displayed in Table 7B suggest that the differences between the
two specifications are minim.al (compare column 1 with column 2, column 3 with
column 4, and column 5 with column 6), but that the different estimating techniques
give rat,her different answers about. the impact of an additional week of benefit
eligibility. The linear, OLS estimates suggest that an additional week of- benefit
eligibility adds about .28 week to the duration of unemployment. The semi-log
estimates suggest that an additional week of benefit eligibility adds about. 20 week to
the duration of unemployment. But theWeibull models,which are the most defensible,
suggest that an additional week of benefit eligibility adds about '.45 week to the
duration of unemployment. If we. take the Weibull models' estimates as "true," and if
these results are representative of the estimates reported in the literature, then they
suggest that models that fail to account for censoring and that make questionable
assumptions about the distribution of unemployment spells may understate the
disincentive effects of additional weeks of unemployment eligibility..
Although the models di.splayed in, Table 78 include a control for the variability of
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earnings, the question remains whether the potential duration of unemployment (Opot)
is really just a proxy for some aspect of a worker's experience before being laid off and
claiming benefits. This is more than possible, since a worker's potential benefit
duration is inversely related to the variability of his or her earnings during the base
period. That base period experience experience may in turn reflect some unobserved
characteristics of the worker that would influence his or her unemployment duration. If
so, then the estimated coefficient of 0pot in a duration equation may capture not the
disincentive effect of longer potential duration of benefits, but rather some unobserved
characteristic.
~ne

way of gaining some insight into this issue is to take data on UI claimants in

a state where the potential duration of benefits is in fact uniform, and simulate a
potential duration of benefits for each claimant as if he or she were in a variable
duration state. This can be done using. one of the potential duration formulas
discussed in section II. If such a simulated potential duration variable, when included
in the duration equation, were to yield results similar to those obtained above for
Washington State, then it would reduce confidence in estimates obtained from
variable duration states.
Table 8 displays the results of such an exercise. Illinois is a uniform duration
state -- all eligible claimants have a 26-week potential duration of benefits. Using the
potential duration formula from Washington State, a simulated potential duration of
benefits was created for each of the workers in two subsamples of Illinois UI claimants
-- those eligible and those ineligible for FSC -- and included in Weibull duration
models similar to those displayed in Table 78.
The main result olthe estimates shown in Table 8 is that the simulated 0pot
variable is a weak predictor of the duration of unemployment. This is true whether or
not the earnings variability measure is included in the estimating equation. If· anything,
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the simulated Opot variable is negatively related to unemployment duration,
suggesting that workers who would be eligible for more weeks of benefits under the
Washington State formula could be expected to have shorter spells of unemployment.
(This makes sense, since workers with stable work histories would be expected to
have a stronger attachment to the labor force, and to return to work relatively quickly.)
The inferer:lce to be drawn is that the estimated coefficients of potential duration in the
Washington State

mo~els

(in Table 78, for example) should perhaps be taken

seriously as estimates of the disincentive effects of increasing the potential duration of
UI benefits. That is, Table 8's results make it more difficult to dismiss estimates of the
disincentive effects of increased potential benefit duration from states where potential
duration varies only with work history during the base period.
2. Estimates from Hazard Models. Table 9 displays unadjusted estimates of the

conditional probability of reemployment--or discrete reemployment hazards--for each
of three groups of UI recipients in Washington State: workers who were eligible for 19
to 21 weeks of benefits; those eligible for 24 to 26 weeks; and those eligible for 30
weeks,14 These hazards, which are based on the well-known Kaplan-Meier estimator,
are descriptive in that they do not adjust for observable differences among these three
groups of workers.
Because UI claimants in Washington State are certified for two weeks of
. benefits at a time, time until exhaustion. of benefits is measured in two-week intervals. 15
~

The unadjusted reemployment hazards in Table 9 are computed by dividing the
14 Workers eligible for 19, 20, and21 weeks of benefits are aggregated in order to yield a group of workers
large enqugh to give a hazard function in which some confidence can be placed. Similarly for workers
eligible for 24, 25, and 26 weeks. The results reported below are not appreciable changed if workers are
not aggregated in this way.
15 Some information is lost by using discrete two-week time periods. Any worker who ended his or her spell
of unemployment an even number of weeks before exhaustion (including zero) and gained
reemployment in the following week is counted as gaining reemployment one week too late. The
importance of this information loss is lessened by the fact that, as Harris (1987) found,.only about half as
many workers receive an even number of weeks of benefits as receive odd number of weeks, mainly
because of the system of certifying for two weeks of benefits ata time. The increased simplicity that results
from using two-week periods outweighs the information loss that may result.
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number of workers who became reemployed during two-week period t prior to benefit
exhaustion by the. number of workers who were unemployed at the beginning of
period t. This latter group--the so-called risk set, or the number of workers "at risk" of
reemployment--is shown in the columns labeled Risk Set, and the unadjusted
reemployment probability is shown in the columns labeled Hazard.
Consider the

an workers who began their spell of unemployment with potential

benefit duration of 19 to 21 weeks. Since 78 of these workers were reemployed by the
end of.weeks 19 and 20 before exhausting their benefits, the reemployment hazarq for
this period is 0.0889. Other reemployment hazards are computed similarly. Note that
the risk set in period t-1 does not generally equal the risk set in period t minus the
number of workers' who gained reemployment by the end of period t. For example,
there were 877 workers eligible for 19-21 weeks of benefits at the beginning of preexhaustion weeks 19 and 20, and 78 of these found reemployment before preexhaustion weeks 17 and 18. But the risk set in period 18 is 775, which is less than
877 minus 78. This occurs because 24 workers left the labor force (that is, stopped
searching for work and collecting UI benefits) during pre-exhaustion weeks 19 and
20. 16
The general time-pattern of the hazards shown in Table 9 is similar for the three
groups: All three hazard functions have an early spike, then fall gradually to a flat
segment with hazards in the neighborhood of .02 to .03., and finally show a large spike
at the time of benefit exhaustion (week 0). Note that there are noticeable upturns in the
hazards just before the exhaustion of benefits.
Although the hazards for the three groups shown in Table 9 are similar in a
general way, closer comparison of the three hazard functions shows some differences.
Mainly, the workers who are eligible for 30 weeks of benefits appear to have higher
16 It is also possible that these workers left Washington State. in Which case it is impossible be know their
labor force status. In either case, treating these cases as incomplete or censored spells of joblessness is
appropriate.
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reemployment hazards early in their unemployment spells than do workers eligible for
19 to 21 weeks or 24 to 26 weeks. This has implications for the unemployment
durations experienced by the three groups.
The bottom rows of Table 9 shows two estimates of the expected duration of
unemployment that is implied by each of the three unadjusted hazard functions.
Estimator.1 of the expected durations is defined as:
(5.1) d1

=2 (f11 + f22 + f33 + ... + ttt + ...)

where
(5.2) ft = (1- h1)(1-h2) ... (1-ht-1 )(ht).
Equation (5.2) gives the unconditional probability of experiencing t two-week periods
of unemployment (calculated as the product of the probabilities (of not finding a job in
each of the first t-1 periods, times

ht,

the conditional probability of finding a job in

period t).
Estimator 2 of the expected durations is defined as:
(5.3) d2 = {(U1)(h1)(1) + (U2)(h2)(2) + (U3)(h3)(3) + ... + (Ut)(ht)(t) + ..;} I U1
where Ut denotes the number of workers in the risk set at the beginning of period t
before benefit exhaustion.
These alternative estimators make different assumptions about whether the
labor market is in equilibrium. Estimator 1 assumes that the market is in equilibrium
and tends to yield higher estimates of the expected duration of unemployment.
Estimator 2 does not make such an assumption and is, in effect, a "mechanical" way of
estimating the expected duration. In both estimators, it is assumed that workers who
have exhausted benefits· have a constant reemployment hazard equal to he (the
hazard in the period in which benefits were exhausted) in perpetuity; for example. he =
0.3485 for workers eligible for 19 to 21 weeks of benefits in Table 9.
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Table 9 shows that the expected duration for workers eligible for 19 to 21 weeks
of benefits was between 14.5 weeks (estimator 1) and 16.6 weeks (estimator 2). For
workers eligible for 24 to 26 weeks of benefits, expected duration was between 14.1
weeks and 18.0 weeks; and for workers eligible for 30 weeks of benefits, expected
duration was between 14.0 weeks and 18.4 weeks.
These estimated expected durations of unemployment can be used to obtain a
direct estimate of how additional weeks of potential benefit duration can be expected
to affect the duration of a worker's unemployment. Estimator 1 suggests that there may
be some impact of extending benefits -- the 5-week increase in potential duration
between 19-21 weeks and 24-26 weeks is associated with an increase of about 1.5 in
the duration of unemployment, or .29 week per additional week of benefit eligibility.
However, the 5-week increase in potential duration between 24-26 weeks and 30
weeks is associated with only a very small increase in unemployment duration -- about
1

.33 week, or .07 week per additional week of benefit eligibility. By the same sort of
reasoning, estimator 2 suggests no impact -- o·r possibly even a negative impact -- of
extending benefits.
An important caveat regarding the estimates shown in Table 9 is that they are.

~ot adjusted for observable characteristics of ·the workers that may in turn be
associated with unemployment duration. This is important, since the apparent negative
impact of additional weeks of benefits implied by estimator 2 could simply ,result from
the fact that workers who are eligible for more weeks of benefits are more likely to
return to work quickly, rather than the separate effect of additional weeks of benefits. It
is possible to adjust for worker characteristics, but this is left for future work.
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8. The .Impact of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) in Illinois

As already noted, the Illinois data that were used above span the expiration of
one of the the emergency UI benefit extensions -- the Federal Supplemental
Compensation program (FSC). Workers eligible for Phase IV of FSC in Illinois had a
total potential duration of benefits of 38 weeks -- 26 weeks of regular state benefit, plus
12 weeks of FSC. In this section, the natural experiment presented by the expiration of
FSC is used to obtain estimates of the additional 12 weeks of benefit eligibility. It is
important to repeat that FSC did not "trigger off" as the standing Extended Benefits
program would have done. Rather, FSC was ended by Congressional fiat in response
to the impression that labor market conditions nationwide -- not just in Illinois -- no
longer requir"ed a Federal emergency benefit program.
Table 10 displays estimates of four Weibull duration models of unemployment;
that is, parametric models of time to reemployment that estimate equation (4.1) under
the assumption that the disturbance term u has the Weibull distribution. The
interpretation of the Weibull model's coefficients is straightforward: Each coefficient
gives the approximate proportional change in unemployment duration that is
attributable to a unit change in the explanatory variable. As already discussed, these
are the most defensible of the duration models that are available, although the hazard
models presented below arguably yield more convincing estimates.
The four models shown in Table 10 use different specifications of the incentives
facing UI recipients. Specifications t and 2 include the replacement rate (based either
on base period earnings or high-quarter earnings), specification 3 includes the weekly
benefit amount and the base period earnings, and specification 3 uses the WelchClassen variables described above. The main finding of the results in Table 10 is that
the impact of FSC-eligibility on unemployment duration is insensitive to these
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variations in specification. The impact of the additional 12 weeks of potential benefit
duration provided by FSC is estimated to be a 19 percent increase in unemployment
duration. 17 This translates into an increase of 4 weeks in unemployment duration, or
.34 week per additional week of benefit eligibility. This estimate is higher than most of
the estimates obtained using the Washington State data -- that is, the estimates that
were based on variability across individuals that resulted from differing base period
work histories.
Table 11 displays estimates of the conditional reemployment probabilities for
two groups of workers in Illinois: those who were eligible for FSC and those who were

ineligible for FSC. These hazards are constructed in an identical manner to those
presented in Table 9, which examined UI recipients in Washington State. That is, they
show the conditional probability of reemployment at various times before exhaustion of
benefits. The patterns of the two hazard functions shown in Table 11 are similar to
each other (and also to the Washington State hazards). Both
fall gradually to

h~ve

an early spike, then

a flat segment, turn up just before exhaustion of benefits, and then

show a large spike at the time of benefit exhaustion (week OJ.
There are also some differences between the hazards for FSC-eligibles and
~SC-ineligibles.

Mainly, the FSC-eligibles appear to have higher reemployment

hazards early in their unemployment spells (weeks 38 through 30 before exhaustion),
but l0'l.!er reemployment hazards later (weeks 26 through 4 prior to exhaustion).
The implications of the hazard functions for unemployment duration are
displayed at the bottom of Table 11. As in Table 9, two estimates of the expected
duration of unemployment are shown. Estimator 1 suggests that the FSC-eligible
workers experienced about 2.8 more weeks of unemployment than did the FSCineligibles, or about .23 week per additional week of benefit eligibility. Estimator 2, on
the other hand, suggests that the FSC-eligible workers experienced 1.3 weeks less
17

The estimate is obtained by dividing the coefficient of FSC-eligibility by the Weibull shape parameter.
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unemployment than did the FSC-ineligibles, or about .11 week less for each additional
week of 'benefit eligibility. This rather unlikely result could. suggest a need to adjust for
observable characteristics of the workers, which could differ between the FSC-eligible
and FSC-ineligible workers.
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VI. Summary and Conclusions

The main. goals of this paper have been to review the sources of variation in the
potential duration of 'unemployment benefits (sections I and II), to review critically
existing estimates of the extent to which increasing potential benefit duration affects
the duration of unemployment (section IV), and to explore the effect of variation in
potential duration on the expected duration of unemployment of UI recipients (section
V). In particular, data from two states were examined in an effort to understand, the
extent to which estimates of the effects of extended benefits are sensitive to differences
in model specification, estimating technique, and the source of variation in potential
benefit duration.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of sources of variation in
potential benefit duration and the review of existing estimates in sections I, II, and IV.
First, differences in the effects of emergency benefit extensions, the Extended

8e~efits

program, and within-state variation in states have variable benefit duration have never
been systematically analyzed. This is an important omission because the impact of an
emergency extension may be quite different from adding to the potential duration of
~enefits

in a variable duration state. The existing estimates, summarized in Table 5,

have not sorted out the extent to which differences in estimated impacts result from
differences in the underlying source of variation in potential benefit duration.
Second, few of the existing studies have examined the extent to which their
estimates are sensitive to estimating technique and model specification. This has
made it difficult to know whether the behavioral impacts being estimated are real or
simply an accident of the data. Section IV reviewed some of the probl,ems inherent in
estimating the disincentive effects of increasing the potential duration of benefits, and it
seems fair to say that they are unusually daunting and make the estimates less
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convincing than most econometric estimates that are based on cross-sectional or
panel data. Accordingly, the importance of sensitivity analysis seem especially
important in regard to this question, but sensitivity analyses have rarely been pursued.
The exercises presented i'n section V can be viewed as an attempt to provide
such a sensitivity analysis on two data sets. The main conclusions of this exercise are
as follows. First, estimates of the impact of an additional week of potential benefit
duration that are derived from a variable duration state such as Washington State are
quite fragile, although they do suggest that there may be some increase in the duration
of unemployment that results from increased potential duration. The largest estimates
of the impact of increased potential duration derive from parametric models of the time'
to· reemployment that account for censoring and assume the underlying distribution of
unemployment spell conforms to the Weibull distribution. These models yield suggest
that an added week of potential benefit duration adds .45 week to the duration of
unemployment of workers who are not recalled to their pre-layoff employer. This
estimate, is not especially sensitive to model specification. Also, using a simulated
potential duration variable in a uniform duration state (Illinois) yields results that
increase confidence that there is a real impact of additional weeks of potential
duration.
Interestingly, though, estimates of the impact of an additional week of potential
benefit duration that are based on a reemployment hazard function suggest a smaller
impact of increasing the potential duration of benefits by one week. Those estimates
suggest that adding a week to the potential duration of benefits adds at most. 29 week
to the expected duration of unemployment, and may have no impact at all. Clearly;
then, the estimates, although relatively insensitive to model specification, are quite
sensitive to modeling technique.
Second,estimates of the impact of an additional week of potential benefit
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duration that come from the expiration of the Federal Supplemental Compensation
program are also sensitive to estimating

~echnique.

A Weibull model of the duration of

joblessness suggests that the availability of FSC increased the expected duration of a
worker's jobless spell by roughly 4 weeks, or by .34 week per additional week of
benefit eligibility. This estimate is actually somewhat lower than the estimate derived
from Washington State using a Weibull model (that estimate was .45 week per
additional week of benefit eligibility).
But a hazard model of the conditional probability of becoming reemployed
again yields lower estimates of the influence of extended benefits on jobless duration.
Specifically, the hazard estimates'suggest that FSC eligibility increased the duration of
unemployment by at most .23 week per additional week of eligibility, and may have
had no impact at all.
Given th.e fragility of the. estimates, it seems sensible to be rather modest in
making claims about our knowledge of the disincentive effects of extended
unemployment benefits. Although· the evidence does suggests that additional weeks of
benefits may increase the duration of unemployment, it is clear that the impact is
difficult to estimate and especially sensitive to estimating technique. In particular, the,
f,indings presented suggest that two avenues of further work could be especially
fruitful. First, examining the robustness of estimates from the hazard
seem to be especially important, given that the hazard model

IS

mode~s wo~ld

most appealing a

priori and has the potential to provide results that are most convincing. Second,
though, it seems important to explore further the variation in disincentives that arise
from different sources of variation in the potential duration of benefits -- emergency,
benefit programs, the Extended Benefit program, or within-state variation in potential
benefit duration. This will require additional data, particularly data that cover an
extended period of time

a~d

a variety of potential duration "regimes'." Only with
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additional work that includes careful sensitivity testing can we expect to improve
understanding of the disincentives of extended benefits.
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Table 1 .
Federal Extended Unemployment Benefit Programs,
1958 to 1995

Program and
Enabling Legislation

Effective Dates
and Extensions

Potential Duration of
Extended
Benefits Provided

Financing

Temporary
Unemployment
Compensation Act,
P.L.85-441

6/58 - 7/59

50 % of regular state
duration, up to 13 weeks.

Interest-free loans to
17 participating states

Temporary Extended
Unemployment
Compensation Act
(TEUC),
P.L.87-6

4/61 - 6/62

50 % of regular state
duration, up to 13 weeks.

Temporary increases in
Federal Unemployment
Tax (.4% in 1962,
.25% in 1963)

Extended
Unemployment
Compensation Act of
1970 (EB), P.L. 91373, with major
amendments in P. L.
96-364, P.L. 96-499,
P.L.97-35,
P.L. 102-318

8/70 to present

50% of regular state
duration, up to 13 weeks

One-half from Federal
Unemployment Tax
revenues paid to
Extended
Unemployment
Compensation Account
(EUCA); one-half
from state UI reserves.

Notes
State participation
voluntary.

EB activated in a state
by an insured
unemployment rate
(lUR) trigger, 8/70 to
present;
EB could be activated
in all states by a
national IUR trigger,

8/70-8/81.
Starting 1980, EB
denied to claimants
refusing to seek or
accept suitable work,
and to claimants who
had quit or been
discharged.
State triggers were
made more restrictive,
8/81. Eligibility for
EB made more
restrictive, 8/81.
Stat~s permitted to
adopt a total
unemployment rate
(TUR) trigger, 3/~3.

Emergency
Unemployment
Compensation Act,
P.L. 92-224 and P.L.
92-329

1/72 - 9/72,
extended to 3/73

50 % of regular state
durations, up to 13 weeks.
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Extended
Unemployment
Compensation Account
(EUCA)

State-level triggers
(different from EB
triggers) used to
activate program.

Table 1
(Continued)

Program and'
Enabling Legislation

Effective Dates
and Extensio~

Federal Supplemental
Benefits (FSB), P.L.
93-572,
P.L.94-12,
P.L.94-45,
P.L.95-19

1/75 - 12/76,
extended to 1/78

Federal Supplemental
Compensation (FSC),
P.L. 97-248,
P.L. 97-424,
P.L.98-21,
P.L.98-135

9/82 - 3/83,
extended to
9/93 and 3/85

Potential Duration of
Extended
Benefits Provided

Financing

Notes

50 % of regular state
duration, up to 13 weeks
(1/75-2/75 and 5/77-1/78);
additional 50 % of regular
state duration, up to 13
weeks provided 3/75-4/77
(that is, up to 26 weeks of
FSC total).

Repayable advances to
EUCA from general
revenues; general
revenues after 3/77

EB program was
activated in all
so total potential
benefit duration
for those eXh,austin!!
between 3/75 and
State-level tr122ers
applied starting
Uniform Federal
eligibility and
disqualification
standards IInlPlelneIlted
4/77 (P.L.

FSC-I (9/82-1/83): 50% of
regular state duration, up to
6 to 10 weeks.
FSC-II (1/83-3/83):
65 % of regular state
duration, up to 8 to 16
weeks.
FSC-III (4/83-9/83):
55 % of regular state
duration, up to 8 to 14
weeks.
FSC-IV (10/83-3/85):
Same as FSC III, except
entitlement did not vary once
established.

General revenues

r
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Potential dur'atic)fi
varied with
status and seDlarate
triggers. Except
FSC-IV, ootential
duration would
whenEB and
status changed.
and FSC-II exh;austc~el
could collect
benefits, but not
IV benefits. EB
eligibility criteria
applied to all
FSC. Available
regular state lA'UI;;UI.<)
and EB (if activated)
had to be exhausted
receive FSC.

En
Ull
Co
19~

P.l
P.l
P.l
P.l
P.l
P.l

Table 1
(Continued)

Program and
Enabling Legislation
Emergency
Unemployment
Compensation Act of
1991 (EUC),
P.L. 102-164,
P.L. 102-182,
P.L. 102-244,
P.L. 102-318,
P.L. 103-6,
P.L. 103-152

Effective Dates
and EXtensions
11/91 - 6/92,
extend¢ to
7/92,
3/93, 10/93,
and 2/94

Potential Duration of
Extended
Benefits Provided
EUC-I (11/91-2/92):
Lesser of 100% of regular
benefits, or 13 or 20 weeks.
EUC-II (2/92-7/92):
Lesser of 130% of regular
benefits, or 26 or 33 weeks.
EUC-III (7/92-3/93):
Lesser of 100% of regular
benefits, or 20 or 26 weeks.
EUC-IV (3/93-10/93):
Lesser of 60 % of regular
benefits, or 10 or 15 weeks
EUC-V (10/93-2/94):
Lesser of 50 % of regular
benefits, or 7 or 13 weeks
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Financing

Notes

Extended
Unemployment
Compensation Account
(EUCA) until 7/92,
general revenues
thereafter

Potential duration
determined at time of
fuing for EUC, and
depended on state's
classification as highor low-unemployment.
EUC entitlement could
be increased if state
moved from low to
high status, or if
program became more
generous; EUC
entitlement could not
be decreased.
Claimants exhausting
benefits between 3/91
and 11/91 could
receive benefits under
"reach-back"
provisions (but no
retroactive benefits
paid).
EB eligib.ility criteria
applied to all phases of
ECU.
Once EVC was
exhausted, a claimant
needed to regain
regular UI eligibility to
receive additional
EUC.

Potential Duration
(weeks)

I

VI

\0

High-Quarter
Earnings ($)

a

b

g

State
Minimum
Weekly
Benefit
Amount

Minimum

Maximum

Base Period
Earnings
($)

Louisiana

8

26

3081

800

0.27

4.00%

6.75

10

Maine

21

26

2730

683

0.33

4.55%

7.25

35

Maryland

26

26

900

576

0.72

4.17%

17.27

25

Massachusetts

10

30

2000

500

0.36

3.85%

9.35

14

Michigan

15

26

2100

525-781

0.52

5.38%

9.67

42

Minnesota

10

26

2999

1000

0.33

3.85%

8.57

38

Mississippi

13

26

2340

780

0.33

3.85%

8.57

30

Missouri

11

26

3510

1000

0.33

4.50%

7.33

45

Montana

8

26

4469

1117-1375

0.32

4.00%

8.00

55

Nebraska

20

26

1575

394-400

0.33

5.00%

6.60

20

Nevada

12

26

1248

400

0.33

4.00%

8.25

16

New Hampshire

26

26

2800

1200

0.30

4.40%

6.82

32

New Jersey

15

26

4375

1094-1623

0.45

4.62%

9.74

75

New Mexico

19

26

1777

1068

0.60

3.85%

15.58

41

New York

26

26

1600

400

0.65

3.85%

16.88

40

North Carolina

13

26

2603

651-868

0.33

3.85%

8.57

25

North Dakota

12

26

3572

1118

0.32

3.85%

8.31

43

Ohio

20

26

6864

1716

0.25

3.85%

6.49

66

. Oklahoma

20

26

0.40

4.00%

10.00

16

Oregon

4

26

0.33

5.00%

6.60

68

State

t::

Minimum requirement for
26 weeks

5304

1326-1360

Potential Duration
(weeks)

High-Quarter
Earnings ($)

a

b

g

State
Minimum
Weeldy
Benefit
Amount

Minimum

Maximum

Base Period
Earnings
($)

Pennsylvania

16

26

1357

900

0.69

4.00%

17.25

35

Puerto Rico

26

26

280

75

0.58

9.30%

6.24

7

Rhode Island

15

26

2961

890

0.36

4.62%

7.79

41

South Carolina

15

26

1560

540

0.33

3.85%

8.57

20

South .Dakota

15

26

2183

728

0.33

3.85%

8.57

28

Tennessee

12

26

3120

780

0.25

3.85%

6.49

30

"9

26

4044

1011-1050

0.27

4.00%

6.75

42

Utah

10

" 26

1800"

450-486

0.27

3.85%

7.01

17

Vermont

26

26

1628

1163

0.42

4.44%

9.46

25

Virgin Islands

13

26

2574

858

0.33

3.85%

8.57

33

·Virginia

12

26

6760

1625

0.25

4.00%

6.25

65

Washington

16

30

5694

1825

0.33

4.00%

8.25

73

West Virginia

26

26

2200

550-600

0.28

4.00%

7.00

24

Wisconsin

12

26

3250

1250

0.40

4.00%

10.00

50

Wyoming

12

26

3467

1000

0.30

4.00%

7.50

16

State

Texas
C-..4
C-..4

Minimum requirement for
26 weeks

I

0'1

0

Source: Comparison of State U.nemployment Insurance Laws, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration;
and authors' calculations.
Notes: Parameter a is -the maximum proportion of base period earnings that can be paid in UI benefit during a given benefit year (see
equation 3 in the text).
Parameter b is the proportion of high-quarter earnings paid as the weekly benefit amount (see equation 4 in the text).
Parameter g = alb and is an index of the state's potential duration generosity.

Table 3
Classification of Workers by Weeks of
VI Benefits Claimed and
Subsequent Labor Force Status

Case

Number of Weeks of
UI Benefits Claimed

Labor Force Status
after Benefit Termination

Number Observed
in Illinois
Data (proportion)

A

Maximum Potential

In Covered Employment

283

(0.13)

B

Maximum Potential

Out of Covered Employment

434

(0.20)

C·

Fewer than Potential

In Covered Employment

1040

(0.48)

D

Fewer than Potential

Out of Covered Employment

405

(0.19)

Notes: Cases B and C are correctly characterized by usual censoring conventions; Cases A and
Dare misspecified by the usual conventions.
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Table 4
Mean Insured Unemployment Durations for Men
by Monetary and Temporal Eligibility for'
Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC)
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Temporal
Eligibility
for FSC

Monetary Eligibility for FSC
Eligible

Ineligible

Eligible

21.387
(0.402)
(N=1131)

16.532
(1.144)
(N=79)

Ineligible

17.864
(0.318)
(N=866)

20.058
(0.957)
(N=86)

Difference

3.524
(0.513)

-3.527
(1.979)

Notes: In order to be monetarily eligible for FSC, a claimant needed to have total base period
earnings equ'al to at least 1.5 times high-earnings quarter of the base period. To be
Temporally Eligible for FSC, a claimant needed to file an initial claim for UI benefits before
September 30, 1984. Insured unemployment duration refers to the total number of weeks of
benefits (both state regular and FSC) received in the claimant's full benefit year.
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Table 5
Selected Estimates of the Impact of Increased Potential Duration of VI Benefits
Change in weeks of
unemployment from
1 added week of
potential ill

Data

Study
Holen (1977)

UI claimants in San Francisco,
Boston, Phoenix, Seattle,
Minneapolis, 1969-70

Classen (1979)

UI claimants in Arizona and
Pennsylvania, 1967-69

.77-.81

OLS linear duration
estimates
Tobit duration estimates

0-.12

Newton and Rosen
(1979)

UI recipients in Georgia,
1974-76

Katz and Ocbs (1980)

Current Population Survey,
individuals in 26 states, 196870 and 1973-77

.17-.23

Moffitt and Nicholson
(1982)

Recipients of EB and FSC, 15
states, 1975-77

.1

Moffitt (1985a)

Continuous Wage and Benefit
History, 1978-83

.15

Moffitt (1985b)

Remarks

Tobit duration estimates
.6

Continuous Wage and Benefit
History, 1978-83:
White men
White women
FSC and EB recipients in 15
states, 1975-78:
Men
Women

Maximum likelihood
duration estimates
Labor supply model,
maximum likelihood
estimates
ill exit rate estimates

UI exit rate estimates
.17
.10
Maximum likelihood
duration estimates
.45
.28

ill recipients in Georgia,

Maximum likelihood
duration estimates

1974-76:
Men
Women

.17
.37

UI claimants in Georgia,
1978-79

.36

Maximum likelihood
duration estimates

Ham and Rea (1987)

Canadian men, 1975-80

.26-.35

ill exit rate estimates

Grossman (1989)

Continuous Wage and Benefit
History, individuals in 3
states, 1981-84

Solon (1985)

Katz and Meyer
(1990)
Davidson and
WoodbUry (1995)

Continuous Wage and Benefit
History, men in 12 states,
1978-83
UI recipients in:
Illinois 1984-85
Pennsylvania 1988-89
Washington 1988-89

ill exit rate estimates of

FSC impacts
.9
UI exit rate estimates
.16-.20
.2
0-.2
0-.2
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Translation of
reemployment bonus
impacts using equilibrium
search model

Table 6
Transformation of Data on Claimants into
Data on Claimant-Weeks .
Panel A: Claimant Records
Claimant

1
2
3

Weeks of Insured
Unemployment

Reemployed

Weekly
Benefit

Eligible
for FSC

$149
$161
$128

o
o

Weekly
Benefit

Eligible
for FSC

1

4
38
0

0
1

1

Panel B: Claimant-Week Records
Claimant

Weeks of Since
Initial Claim

Reemployed

1

$149
$149
$149
' $149
$149
$149

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

$161
$161
$161
$161

1
1

o

$161
$161

1
1
1
1

1
2

1

4

0
0
0
0
0

1

5

2

0
1

2
2
2

0
3

2
3

..
2
2

37
38

3
3

o

o
o

1

1

$128
$128

1

1

1
1

o

o

Notes: The claimant is the unit of observation in the alternative models of employment
duration. The claimant-week is the unit of observation in the reemployment hazard models.
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Potential Duration of Benefits, Benefits, and Unemployment Duration: Alternative Specifications for Washington State
[Dependent Variable: In (weeks of benefits paid)]

Explanatory Variable

Mean
(Std. Dev.)

1

3-

2

-

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

26.86
(4.17)

.028
(.004)

.013
(.003)

.028
(.004)

.018
(.003)

.009
(.003) -

-

.013
(.003)

.007
(.003)

-

.012
(.003)

2.93
(8.49)

-.060

-.060
(.007)

-.059
(.007)

-.060

-.057
(.007)

-.058
(.007)

-

- (.007)

-.058
(.007)

-

(.007)

-.057
(J)()7)

Recall

.110
(.312)

- .679
(.195)

.677
(.195)

.635
(.198)

.639
(.198)

.620·
(.194)

-.975
(.039)

.569
(.198)

.625
(.194)

-.977
(.039)

.573
(.198)

Earnings Variability
($1,0005)1

1,401
(1,901)

-

-

.Q17
(.006)

.028
(.006)

-

.016
(.006)

.021
(.006)

-

.021
(.008)

.028
(.008)

Earnings Variability
* Recall ($1,OOOS)1

154
(762)

-

-

.017
(.0.16)

.016
(.016)

-

.030
(.016)

.021
(.016)

-

.031
(.016)

.012
(.016)

Replacement Rate
(Base period)

.618
(.208)

.400
(.109)

-

.375
(.109)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Replacement Rate
(High quarter)

.464
(.104)

-

.627
(.165)

-

.849
(.172)

-

-

-

-

-

-

15,594
(10,786)

.070
(.016)

.082
(.018)

.046
(.018)

.068
(.018)

-.040
(.014)

-.055
(.014)

-.066
(.016)

-

-

-

Weekly Benefit
Amount ($lOOs)1

151.86
(52.12)

-

-

-

-

.272
(.030)

.294
(.029)

.276
(.030)

-

-

-

Two High-Quarters
Earnings ($10,OOOs)1

9,768
(6,662)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.447
(.051)

.460
(.047)

.410
(.052)

Two High-Quarters
> Maximum ($I00s)1

80.42
(197.23)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-.122
(.015)

-.144
(.016)

-.134
(.016)

R2 (adjusted)

-

.134

.134

.135

.140

.140

.136

.141

.139

.135

.140

F

-

35.4

35.4

34.2

34.5

37.2

35.8

36.0

36.9

35.5

35.7

Dpal

Dpal

* Recall

Base Period
Earnings (510,OOOs)1

-

-

-

-.

--.

= 16.13 (std. dev. = 10.87). Mean of the dependent variable On of week of benefits paid) 2.41 (std. deY. := 1.03).
Estimates derived from a sample of 9,9.82 unemployment insurance claimants who fIled valid claims in Washington State during 1988-89. All equations estimated include the following explanatory
variables in addition to those displayed: age (4 dummies), gender, ethnicity (4 dummies), number of job referrals received from the Employment Service, number of employers during the base
period, geographic location (20 dummies), and industry of employment before job loss (10 dummies).
1 Scaling applies to regression coefficients only; not to descriptive statistics.

Notes: Mean weeks of benefits paid in the sample

lie:

Table 8
Simulated Potential Duration of Benents, Benefits, .and Unemployment Duration: Alternative Specifications for Illinois Using Weibull Duration Model

FSC - Eligible Workers

FSC - ineligible Workers

Mean

Mean
(Std. Dev.)

1

2

3

(Std. Dev.)

4

5

6

22.07
(6.67)

-.012
(.006)

-

-.011
(.007)

21.53
(/.00)

-.007
(.005)

-

-.007
(.006)

5.15
(10.00)

.015
(.007)

-

.014
(.007)

6.88
(10.59)

.005
(.005)

-

.005
(.005)

Recall

.229
(.420)

-.388
(.165)

-.127
(.070)

-.450
(.172)

.310
(.463)

-.093
(.123)

-.052
(.055)

-.173
(.131)

Earnings Variability
($1,000s)1

954
(949)

-

.0003
(.022)

-.011
(.024)

1,017
(992)

-

.010
(.023)

.020
(.025)

Earnings Variability
* Recall ($1,0005)1

228
(574)

-

.082
(.054)

.075
(.054)

341
(728)

-

.071
(.040)

.073
(.040)

Weekly Benefit
Amount ($l00s)1

121.48
(39.54)

.190
(.091)

.100
(.072)

.183
(.100)

121.01
(40.54)

.047
(.079)

-.025
(.063)

-.035
(.091)

Base Period
Earnings (SI0,OOOs}1

13,398
(9,069)

-.094
(.033)

-.117
(.029)

-.093
(.035)

13,135
(9,564)

-.058
(.027)

-.066
(.024)

-.053
(.028)

Weeks of Benefits Paid

22.28
(13.79)

-

-

-

19.09
(9.44)

-

-

-

in (Weeks of Benefits Paid)

2.72
(1.09)

-

-

-

2.69
(.904)

-

-

-

Weibull Shape parameter

-

.962
(.017)

.963
(.017)

.962
(.017)

-

.718
(.015)

.718
(.015)

.718
(.015)

in likelihood for Weibull

-

-5,845

-5,847

-5,844

-

-3,586

-3,586

-3,584

Variable
Simulated Dpct

Simulated Dpct

* Recall

NOles: Estimates derived from samples of 4,367 FSC - Eligible UI claimants and 3,076 FSC - Ineligible UI claimants who med valid claims in Illinois during 1984. All equations estimated include
the following explanatory variables in addition to those displayed: age (3 dummies), gender, ethnicity (4 dummies), number of job referrals received from the Employment Service, number of
employers during the base period. whether a dependants' allowance was received, the length of time between job loss and filing the UI claim, the labor market in which the worker was seeking a
job (5 dummies), and industry of employment before job loss (10 dummies).
1 Scaling applies to regression coefficients only; not to descriptive statistics.

Table 9
Conditional Reemployment Probabilities (Discrete Hazards),
Washington State
Potential Duration of Benefits
24-26 weeks

19-21 weeks

Weeks until
Exhaustion
of Benefias

Risk
Set

Adjusted

Risk

Hazard

Set

Adjusted
Hazard

30 weeks

Set

Adjusted
Hazard.

30

5,085

.0810

28

4,593

.0664

26

4,147

.0511

Risk

24

1,210

.0893

3,733

.0447

22

1,075

.0409

3,374

.0341

20

877

.0889

1,003

.0469

3,081

.0305

18

775

.0555

921

.0347

2,806

.0328

16

718

.0460

847

.0307

2,553

.0239

14

660

.0273

786

.0255

2,349

.0234

12

619

.0216

714

.0336

2,159

.0278

10

580

.0224

648

.0232

1,993

.0211

8

544

.0184

595

.0219

1,845

.0222

6

511

.0313

527

.0209

1,706

.0258

4

468

.0235

484

.0227

1,571

.0216

2

434

.0346

439

.0296

1,460

.0336

0

373

.3485

384

.2318

1,317

.3144

0

,!!

Expected duration
of unemployment
Estimator 1

16.55

18.02

18.35

Estimator 2

14.46

14.06

13.95
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Table 10
Potential Duration of Benefits, Benefits, and Unemployment Duration: Alternative Specifications for Federal Supplemental
Compensation (FSC) in Illinois Using Weibull Duration Model

Explanatory Variable
PSC~ligible

PSC~ligible

* Recall

Recall

Mean
(Std. Dev.)

1

2

3

4

.587
(.492)

.167
(.031)

.167
(.031)

.167
(.031)

.167
(.031)

.134
(.341)

-.045
(.c)60)

-.045
(.060)

-.045
(.060)

-.046
(.060)

.262
(.440)

.007
(.044)

.007
(.044)

.006
(.044)

(.044)

.017
(.015)

.013
(.OlS)

.013
(.015)

.041
(.016)

-

-

-.103
(.197)

-

.006

Earnings Variability
($1,0005)1

~67)

Replacement Rate
(Base period)'

(.234)

Replacement Rate
(High-quarter)1

.449
(.111)

Base Period Earnings
($10,000s)1

13,289
(9,277)

-.092
(.023)

-.096
(.022)

Weekly Benefit Amount
($l()()S)1

121.29
(39.96)

-

-

Two High Quarter Earnings
($10,OOOs)1

8,059
(5,085)

-

-

-

59.79
(143.06)

-

-

-

Weibull Shape parameter

-

.868
(.011)

.868
(.011)

.868
(.011)

.868
(.011)

In likelihood for Weibull

-

-9,517

-9,517

-9,517

-9,518

Two High Quarter
($1005)1

980

.600

>

Maximum

':.020
(.093)

-

-.099

-

(.019)

.046
(.049)

-.105
(.070)

-.025
(.022)

= 20.96 (std. dev. == 12.28). Mean of the dependent variable (In of weeks of benefits paid) = 2.71 (std. dev. - 1.(2).
Estimates derived from a sample of 7,443 UI claimants who med valid claims in Illinois during 1984. All equations estimated include the following explanatory variables in addition to those
displayed: age (3 dummies), gender, ethnicity (4 dummies), number ofjob referrals received from the Employment Service, number of employers during the base period, whether a dependents'
allowance was received, the length of time between job loss and filing the UI claim, the labor market in which the worker was seeking a job (5 dummies), and industry of employment before job
loss (10 dummies).
1 Scaling applies to regression coefficients only; not to descriptive statistics.

NOles: Mean weeks of benefits paid in the sample

Table 11
Conditional Reemployment Probabilities (Discrete Hazards), Illinois

Weeks until
Exhaustion
of Benefits

Ineligible for FSC
Risk Set

Hazard

Eligible for FSC
Risk Set

Hazard

38

2,105

.0912

g6

1,909

.0602

34

1,782

.0466

32

1,686

.0463

30

1,593

.0439

28

1,508

.0345

. 26

1,600

.0688

1,445

.0291

24

1,488

.0477

1,384

.0275

22

1,405

.0349

1,333

.0315

20 .

1,348

.0423

1,265

.0269

18

1,278

.0376

1,214

.0264

16

1,217

.0394

1,165

.0309

14

1,160

.0474

1,105

~0443

12

1,086

.0359

1,042

.1008

10

1,028

.0418

738

.0203

8

968

.0382

706

.0255

6

923

.0563

670

.0239

4

862

.0360

644

.0230

2

807

.0682

605

.0430

0

731

.3926

553

.3816

Expected Duration
of Unemployment
Estimator 1

21.29

24.08

Estimator 2

21.31

19.99
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